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TOWARDS A STUDY OF MEMORY IN US 




Probing the intersection of Memory Studies and International Relations, this article traces the 
uses of collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations. First it surveys the exist-
ing scholarly literature on the topic and critiques some selected methodological models. Next it 
discusses the politics of cultural memory in the United States itself. In its main body, the study 
focuses on the core of the use of memory in US Transatlantic relations: historical reasoning in 
the fields of 1) foreign policy decision-making, and 2) public or cultural diplomacy. The author 
argues that while the US government may not have had a centrally articulated and overarching 
policy for the use of collective memory in US diplomacy, such a policy can nevertheless be 
assembled out of its foreign policy training and the cultural diplomacy practices of the United 
States Information Agency, both of which continued throughout the 1990s, the first period of 
the post-Cold War era.
Keywords: United States, Cold War, memory, foreign policy, cultural diplomacy, transatlantic relations
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In the spring of 2015 – the run-up to the seventieth anniversary of the end 
of World War Two – even an ordinary Internet search showed that recent public 
rhetoric has couched the ongoing crisis in the Ukraine in the terms of that past 
world conflict. It is not only sensationalist journalists, aged cold warriors or implac-
able Ukrainian nationalists who have been calling Russian president Vladimir 
Putin a modern day Hitler. Some of the highest dignitaries in the West who have 
made the same comparison include former US Secretary of State Hillary Clin-
ton, Britain ’ s Prince Charles, and the president of Lithuania – all public  figures 
who know the power of words, and who are fully aware that their reference to 
Europe ’ s darkest period will have a serious effect on the framing of the current 
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crisis in Russian-Western relations.1 While they may be intended as a rhetorical 
line in the sand for Russia, such uses of the past likely exacerbate the conflict rath-
er than de-escalating it. On the other side, Ukrainian Russian separatists and the 
Russian media and government have consistently blamed the conflict on Western 
“fascists”2 – which is their way of evoking their own narrative of the Great War in 
Defense of the Homeland against the Nazis and their collaborators 70 years ago – in 
order to mobilize their side in the current conflict. 
Such heated rhetoric lays bare the potential of public memory to serve as 
a tool of propaganda or cultural diplomacy: to move, persuade, mobilize, and 
commit people to a cause or policy not only nationally, but also in international 
relations. Yet as important as they are, scholars, security analysts and government 
officials need to look not only for short-term preventative measures, but for a for-
mulation of a coherent Transatlantic memory policy to support peaceful relations 
in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In other words, government officials as well 
scholars of nationalism and memory should do more than include memory as one 
of the resources of international relations. They should identify what expressions 
of memory can be used in diplomacy, when and how – and develop models for 
a coherent memory policy.
This article looks for traces of such a memory policy in the use of collective 
memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations.3 First I will survey the existing 
scholarship on the topic, and critique some of its methodological models. Next I will 
1 A few of the many media reports of such framing include “Hillary Clinton ’ s Comparison of Vladimir 
Putin and Adolf Hitler Checks Out,” ABC News Australia, March 31, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au 
/news/2014-03-25/hillary-clinton-putin-hitler-comparison-checks-out/5325608; Guy Faulconb-
ridge and Alissa de Carbonnel, “Prince Charles Provokes Diplomatic Row by Comparing Putin 
to Hitler,” Reuters, May 22, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/22/uk-britain-putin 
-prince-idUKKBN0E20P920140522; and “Lithuanian President Likens Putin to Stalin and Hitler,” 
The Moscow Times, June 23, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lithuanian 
-president-likens-putin-to-stalin-and-hitler/502332.html. 
2 A few of the media reports of such framing include Neil MacFarquhar, “Putin Accuses U.S. of Bac-
king ‘Neo-Fascists’ and ‘Islamic Radicals’,” New York Times, October 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2014/10/25/world/europe/vladimir-putin-lashes-out-at-us-for-backing-neo-fascists-and 
-islamic-radicals.html?_r=0; and Shaun Walker, “Donetsk ’ s Pro-Russia Rebels Celebrate Expelling 
‘Fascist Ukrainian Junta’,” The Guardian, September 8, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014 
/sep/08/donetsk-pro-russia-rebels-ukrainian-junta.
3 This article discusses the author ’ s preliminary findings in the multi-sited and multi-member rese-
arch project “The Role of Collective Memory in Post-Cold War Transatlantic Relations,” funded by 
the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic. The article also benefited from the author ’ s post-doctoral 
research fellowship at the at the Centre for Collective Memory Research at the Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Charles University, Prague, the Czech Republic, as well as from the author ’ s research 
fellowship at the International Forum for U.S. Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign, Illinois, USA.
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discuss the politics of cultural memory in the United States itself, which I argue 
is dynamic, multi-player, yet still hierarchically structured. The main body of this 
study then focuses on the core of the use of memory in US Transatlantic relations: 
historical reasoning in the fields of 1) training for foreign policy decision-making; 
and 2) public or cultural diplomacy. First I will interpret as primary source a late 
Cold War university course textbook written to train future government officials 
in the application of historical analogies in decision making. I will conclude with 
an analysis of the United States Information Agency ’ s overseas commemorative 
programming for the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution as a case study 
of the uses of collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlantic relations. My 
analyses demonstrate that while the US government may not have had a centrally 
articulated and overarching policy for the use of collective memory in US diplo-
macy, such a policy can nevertheless be assembled out of its foreign policy training 
and cultural diplomacy practices, both of which continued throughout the 1990s, 
the first period of the post-Cold War era. 
1. The Role of Memory in Transatlantic Relations
Until early 2014, most scholars of US-European relations concluded that the 
Transatlantic bond has been weakened in the last decade, and some even seri-
ously questioned its future.4 The focal point of most discussions on Transatlantic 
ties has tended to be the role of values on which the partnership has been built. 
According to Robert Kagan, fundamental differences in the approach towards new 
security threats, the use of force versus negotiation, the nature and merits of a glo-
balized economy, and environmental issues all stand in the way of developing an 
effective partnership across the Atlantic in the future.5 On the other hand, Jeffrey 
J. Anderson, G. John Ikenberry and Thomas Risse suggested that the current dis-
agreements may be neither fatal nor permanent, but minor and transient.6 They 
conclude that the strains in Transatlantic relations notwithstanding, the current 
crisis by no means signifies the “end of the West.” Timothy Garton Ash was even 
more optimistic about the prospects of Transatlantic cooperation than Anderson 
et al. when he insisted that “there are not two separate sets of values, European 
4 See Andrew Dorman and Joyce Kaufman, eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perception, 
Policy and Practice (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
5 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2004). 
6 See J. Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry, and Thomas Risse, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and 
Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
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and American, but several intersecting sets of values,” that allow for successful and 
productive transatlantic cooperation.7 
In sharp contrast to the previous decade, by the time of this writing (the 
spring of 2015), the crisis in the Ukraine has opened a new chapter in Transat-
lantic relations. Combined with efforts to reduce the region ’ s dependence on Rus-
sian-supplied energy, the recent US and Western European economic sanctions 
against the Russian Federation, their political pressure, aid to the Ukrainian gov-
ernment, and the sending of US military materiel and troops to Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic states signal a tightening of the Transatlantic alliance in the face of 
Russian expansionism and civil strife in these parts of Europe. As demonstrated 
above, the crisis is often framed in terms of the memory of World War Two. This 
current use of memory in Transatlantic relations locks the parties into the current 
conflict by mobilizing their sides through an uncritical use historical analogies. 
While historians of the Second World War can map out the faults of such anal-
ogies, this article is concerned with an apparent lack of policy planning for the 
use of memory in Transatlantic relations. By adding an analysis of the politics of 
remembering, collective memory and representations of the past to the current 
discussions about the prospects of Transatlantic relations, this paper aims to con-
tribute to filling a gap in scholarly literature.
The study of memory has a voluminous literature. As Duncan S. A. Bell has 
observed, since the 1970s memory has become a veritable “organizing principle 
of scholarly [and] artistic work” in sociology, anthropology, history and cultur-
al studies.8 More recently, Patrick Finney has characterized the field of Memory 
Studies as a “vast interdisciplinary enterprise.”9 Theoretically developed first by 
Maurice Halbwachs,10 in recent years the concept of collective memory has been 
advanced in particular by Jan and Aleida Assmann.11 As Peter Novick argued, the 
key idea that emerged from this field was that the quest to reconstruct and codify 
an “objective history” was not as relevant to social reality as the perceptions of the 
  7 See Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2005), 168. 
  8 Duncan S. A. Bell, ed., Memory, Trauma and World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
1, 7.
  9 Patrick Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International Histo-
ry,” International History Review Vol. 36, No. 3 (2014): 445. 
10 Maurice Halbwachs, La Mémoire Collective (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950). English 
translation Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row Colophon Books, 1980). 
11 Aleida Assmann, Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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past within collective memory.12 Depending on the scale of analysis, a smaller or 
larger variety of actors contribute to the construction and reproduction of collec-
tive memory. 
The idea that collective memory is located primarily in the minds of a given 
community and thus can be used as an analytical category has been critiqued by 
a number of scholars. For one, Pauli Bauer has pointed out that such analytical use 
of the concept of collective memory privileges it as some kind of monolithic con-
cept, erasing the diversity and dynamism of its formation, expressions, reproduc-
tion and transmission, and shifts in remembrance.13 Both Jeffrey K. Olick and Erica 
Resende and Dovile Budryte have argued that “memory should be treated as a ‘sen-
sitizing concept’ (but not as an operational concept, a measurable phenomenon), 
drawing our attention to the importance of representations of the past (especially 
the traumatic past) in the construction of group identities.”14 As James V. Wertsch 
has cautioned, “We must remember that collective memory is a process and not 
a thing, a faculty rather than a place. Collective memory is something – or rather, 
many things – we do, not something or many things we have.”15 Heeding such 
warnings, this article will not try to define the nature of collective memory – rather, 
it will focus on its manifestations, such as historical rhetoric in decision making 
and anniversaries and commemorations, in order to understand how it was used in 
late twentieth century US Transatlantic diplomacy. Collective memory is a potent 
political force, as it serves as an important frame of reference for proposed policies 
as well as for their public justification. There is an inherent tension between the 
desire for a more neutral view of history based primarily on the critical examination 
of evidence, and the utilitarian interpretation of selected events to serve political 
purposes. As pointed out by Langenbacher and Shain, understanding collective 
memory as a tool to mobilize people is highly relevant for international relations 
and international politics.16 
This article joins a growing body of scholarship on the role of memory in an 
international context. Mostly during the last decade, scholars have been examining 
12 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream. The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
13 Dr. Pauli Bauer, personal communication, October 2014. 
14 Jeffrey K. Olick, The Politics of Regret. On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (New York: 
Routledge, 2007); and Erica Resende and Dovile Budryte, eds., Memory and Trauma in International 
Relations: Theories, Cases and Debates (New York: Routledge, 2014), 3.
15 James V. Wertsch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 40.
16 Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain, eds., Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International 
Relations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 11.
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a variety of aspects of the topic, including the ways in which policy and decision 
makers utilize memory,17 the relationship between trauma, memory, and interna-
tional politics,18 the multiplicity of actors who shape memory and thereby influ-
ence international relations,19 the uses of memory in the Global War on Terror,20 
and the role of memory in the conflicts in post-Cold War Europe.21 The scholarly 
consensus is that “there is copious contemporary and historical evidence that col-
lective memories can impact upon the course of international relations.”22 Yet as 
Patrick Finney has argued, scholars of international history need to take memory 
more seriously than they so far have.23 Among others, Finney ’ s research agenda pre-
scribes a renewed focus on the role of collective memory in international decision 
making24 – which this paper will discuss in the context of late Cold War US for-
eign  policy training. As I will show, however, this is a scholarly project fraught with 
17 William Inboden, “Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: 
A Taxonomy,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014): 291–318; R. D. Schulzinger, 
“Memory and Understanding U.S. Foreign Relations,” in Explaining the History of American 
 Foreign Relations, ed. M. J. Hogan and T. G. Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 336–52; Roland Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War,” Political Science Quarterly, cxvii 
(2002): 423–50; and R. E. Neustadt and E. R. May, Thinking in Time: the Uses of History for Deci-
sion-Makers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986). 
18 Resende and Dudryte, eds., Memory and Trauma in International Relations; Olick, The Politics of 
Regret; and Bell, ed., Memory, Trauma and World Politics. 
19 Langenbacher and Shain, eds., Power and the Past. 
20 Omer Bartov, “September 11 in the Rearview Mirror: Contemporary Policies and Perceptions of the 
Past”; Michael Kazin, “The Eventful Dates 12/12 and 9/11: Tales of Power and Tales of Experience 
in Contemporary History”; Jeffrey Herf, “The Use and Abuse of History in Berlin and Washington 
since 9/11: A Plea for a New Era of Candor”; and Thomas U. Berger, “Of Shrines and Hooligans: The 
Structure of the History Problem in East Asia after 9/11”, in Power and the Past: Collective Memory 
and International Relations, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington, D.C.: George-
town University Press, 2010), 147–60, 161–72, 173–88, and 189–202, respectively; D. B. MacDonald, 
Thinking History, Fighting Evil: Neoconservatives and the Perils of Analogy in American Politics (Lan-
ham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); D. Hoogland Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy: World War 
II, the War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs, vii (2004), 
339–66; and Liam Kennedy, “Remembering September 11: Photography as Cultural Diplomacy,” 
International Affairs 79 (2003): 315–26.
21 Dan Stone, “Memory Wars in the New Europe,” in The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European His-
tory, ed. Dan Stone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 714–31; Maria Mälksoo, The Politics 
of Becoming European: a Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries (New York: 
Routledge, 2010); Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War,” 423–50; D. B. MacDonald, Balkan Holo-
causts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002); and Jan-Werner Müller, Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: 
Studies in the Presence of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
22 Patrick Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence of the Past? Collective Memory and International Histo-
ry,” International History Review Vol. 36, No. 3 (2014): 457.
23 Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence,” 449, 450, 464.
24 Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence,” 452.
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pitfalls; instead, it is more fruitful to analyze how collective memory is used in US 
foreign policy – and this is my real project here. 
Much of the recent scholarly discussions concerned the precise nature and 
dynamics of collective memory, and thus the very conceptual framework that is 
used to study it. Several scholars have warned against the proliferation and indis-
criminate use of the term memory, and have called for greater theoretical rigor as 
reflected in terminology. For one, Jay Winter has discarded the original term alto-
gether and recommended the adoption of remembrance to denote a focus on the 
actors and the politics of remembering.25 The most nuanced of such interventions 
came from Duncan Bell, who advocated for a conceptual separation of collective 
memory and national mythology. For him,
Collective memory is understood as the process whereby groups of individuals share 
and to some extent harmonize (autobiographical) memories of past experiences, and it 
is therefore limited spatially and temporally. Myths, meanwhile, can escape the bounds 
of experience – they are simplified, highly selective and widely shared narrations of 
an imagined past, the stories that people and groups tell about their location (and 
meaning) in time.26
In Bell ’ s formulation, only war veterans’, trauma survivors’ and historical wit-
nesses’ recollections could be called memory. Anything outside of these – among 
them cultural representations, rhetorical invocations, and non-witness social rit-
uals of remembering – would have to be termed national mythology. While he 
acknowledges that “they interpenetrate and overlap at various points,” Bell never-
theless insists that “it is essential to try and delineate them, even if this undertak-
ing can never be achieved completely.”27 
My formulation of memory takes issue with Bell ’ s demarcation. Witnesses or 
participants of the original event are but one of the many groups in any society 
who shape collective memory; there is ample proof that while they exert some 
influence, they do not fully fix the meaning of historical events for the nation even 
in their own lifetime. Their experience and lessons derived from their (already 
multiple and conflicting) experiences of the original event are at best mediated 
through other social, cultural and political structures (including shifting political 
regimes, intergenerational communication, and the media and popular culture 
25 Jay Winter, Remembering War: the Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3.
26 Bell, Memory, Trauma and World Politics, 27, emphasis added.
27 Bell, 27.
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industry). What is more, with the passing of this witness generation, their experi-
ences are increasingly folded into representations of national memory. (In national 
crises or under repressive regimes, their memories may even be silenced or at least 
driven underground.) Thus, veterans are but one subculture of a larger nation-
al memory that can be discerned from its expressions. The scholarly consensus 
emphasizes the political nature of such understanding of the past: collective mem-
ory is constructed, enacted and contested by a multiplicity of actors.28 The politics 
of cultural memory in the United States is a prime example of this – this will be 
discussed in part 2. 
Of the many nuanced but contentious definitions of collective memory, my 
use of the term public memory is closest to Jan Assmann ’ s concept of cultur-
al memory, which denotes the ways of institutionalized remembering of (most 
usually) the national past. Assmann defines cultural memory as “that body of 
reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose 
‘cultivation’ serves to stabilize and convey that society ’ s self-image. Upon such 
collective knowledge […] each group bases its awareness of unity and particu-
larity.”29 As Wulf Kansteiner subsequently elucidated, “Cultural memory consists 
of objectified culture – that is, the texts, rites, images, buildings and monuments 
which are designed to recall fateful events in the history of the collective. As 
the officially sanctioned heritage of a society, they are intended for the longue 
durée.”30 Part 3 of this article traces the deployment of such cultural memory in 
late Cold War US Transatlantic relations. 
2. National Memory in the United States
As a historically diverse and dynamic albeit “imperfect” democracy, the Unit-
ed States is a prime example of the contested and multiple meanings of the nation-
al past. Historically, the continuing presence of the indigenous population during 
and after the European colonization of the continent, the Transatlantic slave trade, 
and immigration from Europe, Asia and Latin America have all made for sub-
cultural collective memories that coexist as well as contend with the dominant 
28 Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence,” 448; Resende and Dudryte, eds., Memory and Trauma in Inter-
national Relations, 62, 63, 71–73; Langenbacher and Shain, eds., Power and the Past, 8; Bell, Memory, 
Trauma and World Politics, 5, 15.
29 Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” New German Critique, lxv (1995): 126, 
127, 132.
30 Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: a Methodological Critique of Collective Memory 
Studies,” History and Theory, xli (2002): 182.
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memory regime of the white Anglo-American middle class. African American 
commemorative traditions range from the “Mardi Gras Indians”31 to the celebra-
tion of Juneteenth, the anniversary of the announcement of the abolition of slav-
ery in Texas on June 19, 1865. As a result of massive immigration, European-de-
rived US ethnic groups including the Irish, the Italians and the Poles also exert an 
influence on local and regional memory.32 As Kryštof Kozák has shown, Mexican 
Americans have their distinct memory of the history of Texas and US-Mexican 
relations.33
Just as importantly, the ideal of equality enshrined in the United States Con-
stitution as well as the widely accepted adage that “immigrants made this nation” 
have also provided a point of reference and a powerful justification for the attempts 
of subcultural groups to reinterpret the national past based on their memory. Thus, 
many of the nation ’ s subcultural and historically marginalized groups – among 
them African and Native Americans, women, and dissenters – have both contested 
and used various anniversaries of the national past to commemoratively perform 
their own meaning of the original event, and make claims for political, social and 
cultural rights. The Civil Rights Movement ’ s 1963 March on Washington used the 
hundred ’ s anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation and the site of the Lin-
coln Memorial; the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence saw com-
memorations by a so-called “Bicentennial without Colonies” coalition for social and 
political causes; and American Indians have been publicly counter-commemorating 
Columbus Day at least since the late twentieth century.34 As a result of Euro-Ameri-
can preferences, ethnic activism, moral imperatives, and to appeal to ethnic voters in 
elections, several originally subcultural anniversaries such as Columbus Day, June-
teenth, Kwanzaa and Black History Month have also been lifted or reworked into 
state and federal government commemorative programming.
Yet the dominant Anglo and Euro-American memory regime continues to 
not only define US national memory, but – through its periodic reassertion often 
31 See Joseph Roach, Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996); George Lipsitz, “Mardi Gras Indians: Carnival and Counter-Narrative in Black New 
Orleans,” Cultural Critique No. 10 (Fall 1988): 99–121. 
32 John Bodnar, “The Construction of Ethnic Memory” and “Conclusion: Subcultures and the Regime,” 
in Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century, by 
John Bodnar (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 41–77 and 245–54, respectively.
33 Kryštof Kozák, “Superiors, Victims, or Neighbors? The Collective Memory Divide between Anglos 
and Mexicans,” The United States as a Divided Nation – Past and Present, ed. Marcin Grabowski, 
Kryštof Kozák and György Tóth (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2014), 269–86.
34 Sam Hitchmough, “‘It ’ s  Not Your Country Any More’: Contested National Narratives and the 
Columbus Day Parade Protests in Denver,” European Journal of American Culture Vol. 32, No. 3 
(September 2013): 263–83.
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triggered by a perceived or actual crisis – to enact its edicts with an iron hand. Many 
of its official patriotic rituals and stories were developed or codified in the late nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries as part of US nativist efforts to “Americanize” immi-
grants thought to be significantly different from the Anglo-European settlers. Con-
servative Anglo-Americans and national leaders also responded to the appearance 
of leftist ideologies, the struggles of organized labor, US involvement in two world 
wars, and the Cold War by devising such cultural-political “litmus tests” as the rituals 
around the national flag, the Pledge of Allegiance, and other “invented traditions” 
of civil pageantry.35 Historic battlefields and the war dead in country and abroad are 
venerated through serious rituals not only by the national government, but also by 
veterans’ groups, civic associations, and historical re-enactors.36 The resurgence of 
iron-clad patriotism bordering on intolerant nationalism as a response to the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks is but the most recent and obvious example of 
the continued hegemony of this national memory regime in the United States.37 
Out of sincere patriotism, self or group interest, or a pressure to acculturate, most 
subcultural groups at least strategically subscribe to the patriotic values and rituals 
represented by the dominant American memory regime.
The functions of this hegemonic US national memory are predictable. Above 
all, the official, public history and educational version of the national past aims 
to maintain unity, coherence, and loyalty to the status quo in politics, society, 
and culture. As early as around the birth of the new nation, the British-American 
painter Benjamin West created pictures such as his 1770 Death of General Wolfe 
to remind seething elites on both sides of the Atlantic of their shared British pat-
riotism, which had recently won a war against France.38 Painting his Washington 
Crossing the Delaware in 1850–51 in Düsseldorf, Germany, German-American 
painter Emmanuel Leutze deliberately picked the theme of patriotic courage turn-
ing the tide of the American Revolution in order to invoke the glorious past shared 
both by slaveholders, moderate US politicians, and abolitionists, who were now 
inching closer to a civil war. As David Blight has shown, by the early twentieth 
century veterans’ reunions, popular romances and plays, and political rhetoric had 
managed to purge the memory of the US Civil War of its racial component, and 
35 Bodnar, Remaking America; Richard M. Fried, The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! 
Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
36 Edward T. Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and their Battlefields (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1991).
37 Among others, see Susan Faludi, The Terror Dream (New York: Picador, 2007). 
38 Benjamin West ’ s 1770 painting titled Death of General Wolfe depicted a scene from the Battle of 
Quebec in 1759, waged against France as part of the Seven Years’ War. 
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slavery as a cause of the conflict was erased by the official white reconciliationist 
remembrance.39 
Even more than in other countries, another powerful player in the expressions 
as well as shaping of US national memory is the media and popular culture indus-
try. Early film showed its potential to influence interpretations of history through 
D. W. Griffith ’ s 1915 The Birth of a Nation, which popularized a white supremacist 
and reconciliationist revision of the memory of the Civil War and Radical Recon-
struction. The Disney Company ’ s Davy Crockett television series in the 1950s tapped 
into a yearning for guidance from the past about American values that could help US 
society fight the Cold War. Since the late twentieth century, historical documentaries 
directed by Ken Burns have powerfully shaped the ways in which Americans repre-
sent their past as well as how they understand it40 – his 1990 The Civil War aimed to 
create order out of the diversity of multiculturalism for his mainstream white middle 
class older male audience.41 In the twenty-first century, TV period fiction drama 
shows like Deadwood, Mad Men and Hell on Wheels use a historical epoch as a back-
drop to intricate plots of social intrigue. At the same time, the major US history cable 
channels have come to be dominated by reality TV-style documentaries relying on 
low-cost re-enactments42 and often focusing on the sensational parts of history; their 
products such as The Deadliest Warrior have influenced the computer animation and 
video games, as well as popular content on the Internet. 
The reigning mode of media remembrance of US history, especially of wars, 
is highly personalized, demands identification with characters,43 and emphasizes 
the everyday life and struggles of its subjects. This is combined with a demand for 
accuracy of detail in design and props not unlike in historical re-enactment – it is 
no wonder that many historical documentaries rely on re-enactment even more 
than the Ken Burns methods of film making. Especially evident in war movies and 
shows such as Saving Private Ryan and Band of Brothers, such “tyranny of details” 
39 David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, MA, London: 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
40 Gary R. Edgerton, “Mediating Thomas Jefferson: Ken Burns as Popular Historian,” in Television 
Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age, ed. Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins 
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 168–90.
41 Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, eds., Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the 
Media Age (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 4–5.
42 One instance where re-enactment is a positive development in historical documentary film making 
is the American Indian history documentary series We Shall Remain (dir. Chris Eyre, Public Broad-
casting Service: 2009), in which re-enactment serves to empower Native Americans to represent 
their own history, and thereby also becomes an expression of their memory. For more on the film, 
see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/weshallremain/. 
43 Edgerton and Rollins, eds., Television Histories, 2–3.
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tends to privilege the immediate experience of “being there”44 and the microhis-
torical struggles of the little man over critical reflection about the wider historical 
context, and it obscures or erases the moral dimension of history, the responsibili-
ty of political and other leaders, as well as the larger historical structures and forces 
that conditioned the struggle of the characters. 
Yet the American popular culture industry ’ s memory regime does not go 
unchallenged by the historical professions. “Traditional” entities like history 
museums, archives, libraries and universities have made inroads in popular histo-
ry through their ingenious use of digital social media.45 Even in a narrower sense, 
professional historians continue to exert influence on US collective memory. Not 
only do they serve as consultants for documentary and nonfiction feature films, 
a few of them also influence the thinking of presidents. While David Blight was 
historical consultant for the 2012 movie Lincoln, directed by Steven Spielberg and 
starring Daniel Day-Lewis, in his first term President Barack Obama claimed he 
gave much thought to the lessons in Doris Kearns Goodwin ’ s book Team of Rivals: 
The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln.
Not unlike in other countries, the post-Cold War period witnessed intense 
struggles over the ideological content of expressions of memory in the United 
States. Veterans’ groups and conservatives in politics and the media fiercely reas-
serted their patriotic memory regime by criticizing the critical interpretation of 
the role of art in the conquest of the West in the Smithsonian ’ s 1991 exhibition 
titled The West as America, Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920,46 as 
well as the perspectives of the US nuclear strike on Japan in its 1995 display Cross-
roads: The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb and the Cold War.47 Over the 
same years, former chairperson of the National Endowment for the Humanities 
Lynne Cheney criticized the US history curriculum for teaching a negative view 
44 Edgerton and Rollins, eds., Television Histories, 3.
45 One example of the many is the Internet and digital social media use of the Special Collections and 
University Archives of The University of Iowa: they regularly work through a Facebook profile, Twi-
tter, Pinterest and Tumblr account, as well as projects of digitization and “crowdsourcing” (asking 
Internet visitors to interactively improve content) on their own websites. Online respectively, http://
uispeccoll.tumblr.com/. 
46 Stephen C. Behrendt, Review of The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920, 
ed. by William H. Truettner, Great Plains Quarterly 1, 1 (1992), 289–90, http://digitalcommons.unl 
.edu/greatplainsquarterly/652/. See also “Vox Populi” readers’ comments book, New York Times, July 7, 
1991, http://people.virginia.edu/~mmw3v/west/reviews/nyt_commentbook.pdf.
47 Neil A. Lewis, “Smithsonian Substantially Alters Enola Gay Exhibit After Criticism,” New York Times, 
October 1, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/01/us/smithsonian-substantially-alters-enola-gay 
-exhibit-after-criticism.html. Also see “The Enola Gay Controversy,” History on Trial. Lehigh Univer-
sity Digital Library, http://digital.lib.lehigh.edu/trial/enola/.
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of the national past – emphasizing the injustices committed against American 
minorities and other nations over the country ’ s exceptional achievements and 
values of Christian faith, U.S. capitalist enterprise, democracy, technological and 
scientific progress, and the U.S. as a world power.48 Chilling progressive efforts to 
influence popular history, such attacks were part of a larger conservative revival 
and mobilization in politics to gain power for the Republican Party and its patri-
otic-nationalist ethos.49
3. The Legacy of the Cold War for Memory in US Transatlantic Relations
For over 40 years, the government of the United States functioned under 
the ideological assumptions of the Cold War, for which some of the best and the 
brightest of the country developed corresponding security apparatuses and oper-
ating procedures. Accordingly, American policy and decision makers as well as of 
the larger circles of the national elite attempted to utilize all realms of knowledge 
that could plausibly assist them in containing if not winning their global struggle. 
In order to understand the outlook of some of the power players in US govern-
ment beyond the end of the Cold War, it is necessary to study their use of memory 
in the late phase of the global contest. 
Collective Memory and Decision Making
For Patrick Finney ’ s research focus on the role of collective memory in inter-
national decision making,50 one potential smoking gun is R. E. Neustadt and 
E. R. May ’ s 1986 book Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers.51 
Because of the timing of its publication and its likely influence on decision making 
processes,52 the book bears closer examination. 
48 See Lynne Cheney, Telling the Truth: Why Our Culture and Our Country Have Stopped Making Sen-
se – And What We Can Do About It (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
49 See James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic Books, 
1991); and Richard Jensen, “The Culture Wars, 1965–1995: A Historian ’ s Map,” Journal of Social 
History 29 (October 1995): 17–37.
50 Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence,” 452.
51 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time.
52 What Neustadt and May called “historical reasoning” or “historical analogies” fits into my formu-
lation of collective memory, which is comprised of personal memory, the dominant and official 
memory regime, the influence of the historical professions, popular culture, cultural memory, and 
subcultural memories. Hence I use the authors’ terms to refer to memory here. 
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Published in 1986 by Macmillan USA, reprinted in 1988 by Free Press, 
and deemed profitable enough to issue on e-readers in 2011,53 Neustadt and 
May ’ s book continues to be assigned in graduate-level university courses,54 and 
it is featured under “Leadership and Management” on the recommended reading 
list of the American Foreign Service Association, the professional association and 
labor union of both the US State Department and USAID.55 Academic and pro-
fessional communities continue to find the book relevant and make it part of the 
expertise needed by those in high government office. Written by two professors at 
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, both of whom 
had also served in or worked with several presidential administrations and advised 
those in power or close to it, the book is as close to being a manual or policy paper 
for a conscious and “routine” use of historical reasoning in decision making as 
a document can be. In the late Cold War and the post-Communist period, Think-
ing in Time was used in the training of generations of people who went into public 
service, some of whom subsequently worked their way up to high levels of govern-
ment and policy making, and are still there in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century. In this sense, the book offers both descriptive and prescriptive insights 
into the role of memory in decision making in the United States government.
To answer the question “could better routine staff work have achieved better 
results?”56 the book examines a number of case studies from the 1950s through the 
1980s of right and wrong decisions based on historical analogies. Yet even as they 
draw conclusions, Neustadt and May go beyond the usual judgment by profes-
sional historians that government does not know or use history. The authors focus 
53 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, on Barnes and Noble, http://www.barnesandnoble.com 
/w/thinking-in-time-richard-e-neustadt/1111508544?ean=9780029227916. 
54 Among others, the book is assigned as a reading in courses at the Sanford School of Public Pol-
icy, Duke University (http://www.hart.sanford.duke.edu/index.php/courses/syllabus/hist_195s.06 
_-_leadership_in_american_history); the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, 
Florida International University (http://sipa.fiu.edu/about-us/sipa-senior-fellows-1/dexter-lehtinen 
/syllabus/); Tufts University (http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/curriculum/syllabi/fall2014/ps101.pdf); 
the American Academy of Diplomacy (http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/programs/Diplomacy 
_and_Education/AAD_Member_Course_Syllabi/Edelman%20SAIS_Diplomatic%20Disasters%20
Syllabus.pdf); the School of International Relations, the University of Southern California (dornsife.
usc.edu/assets/sites/32/docs/IR_341_Fall14_Syllabus-2.doc ); the School of Policy, Government, and 
International Affairs, George Mason University (http://spgia.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/PDFs 
/Syllabi/2014/Fall/PUBP/Rhodes-PUBP700-006-Fall-2014.pdf); the University of Colorado at Boul-
der (http://www.colorado.edu/history/chester/IAFS1000Syllabus2006.htm); and Oberlin College 
(http://new.oberlin.edu/dotAsset/1713746.pdf).
55 Recommended reading list. American Foreign Service Association, http://www.afsa.org/Publications 
Resources/FSReadingList/AFSARecommendedReading.aspx.
56 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, xiii–xv, 3.
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on formulating micro-procedures for even marginally better results in decision 
making, working within the confines of contingency situations at the highest levels 
of government. Accordingly, the book recommends a to-do list of fast background 
research and conceptual moves that lead to better situation assessment, options 
and decisions. 
Neustadt and May ’ s criticism of the usual use of historical reasoning in deci-
sion making is not that government officials do not use analogies from the past – it 
is that they use them without adequate reflection and without questioning their 
appropriateness for the current situation. Most such situations begin with a cri-
sis that requires an urgent response, which forces decision makers into a reactive 
position. Leaders are often tempted to use historical analogies as shorthand for 
the complex current scenario – regardless of their appropriateness for it. Com-
bined with the pressure to act, such ready-made parallels make careful deliber-
ation difficult.57 The authors’ lessons from successful decision making show that 
careful reflection and an examination of the presumptions of historical parallels 
and proposed options tend to yield better policy results. For example, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson intervened in the Kennedy cabinet ’ s deliberations during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis by explaining why the current situation was not analogous to 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, causing the president ’ s war council to change 
their positions.58 
Among others, successful decision makers ask about the history and memory 
of their and their adversaries’ institutions and well as persons, thus arraying for 
patterns of behavior that can be used to predict actions and reactions in the cur-
rent crisis. At the same time, such leaders also envisioned their own challenge on 
a time line of the history of the topic at hand.59 Neustadt and May illuminate that 
what often allows for better decision making is buying time for careful deliberation 
and keeping policy options open. 
In their book, Neustadt and May paint a revealing picture of the culture of 
those in power. Leaders do not usually think about history for their own decisions; 
they have little time to focus on an issue even when it presents them with a crisis; 
and their decisions are mostly reactive, aimed at alleviating crises and averting 
disasters, thus postponing rather than permanently resolving problems. Yet it is 
precisely such dynamic that would call for a formulation of a policy for the use of 
memory in diplomacy. A memory policy would provide the conceptual as well as 
57 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 4–5.
58 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 7.
59 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 235–36, 238, 246.
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material (deliberative/advising, communicative, implementation) infrastructure 
and personnel to go beyond reactive work, and into a proactive mode. 
Neustadt and May ’ s study of the use of historical reasoning in decision mak-
ing is tempting to apply for late Cold War US foreign policy and beyond. Yet the 
authors themselves reveal some of the methodological pitfalls of their own frame-
work. For example, while the transcripts of the Kennedy deliberations over the 
Cuban Missile Crisis show references to Pearl Harbor and Suez, no one mentioned 
any earlier historical periods – yet in the president ’ s official speech he referred to 
the “clear lesson” of the appeasement policies to Nazi Germany in the 1930s.60 This 
shows how difficult it is for scholars of the use of memory in government to verify 
claims in the absence of accessible contemporary internal documents. Political 
speeches like Kennedy ’ s and public diplomacy materials like those issued by the 
US State Department use collective memory rhetorically, but they do not readily 
yield insights into the dynamic of government decision making or formulations 
of policy. 
Some scholars have cautiously applied Neustadt and May ’ s  framework for 
post-1990 US decision making,61 notwithstanding the methodological questions 
that plague the project. As William Inboden has shown, President Bush the elder 
used the 1938 Munich Agreement to understand the situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait in 1990 and decide for US intervention – both in a speech in Prague and in 
a private letter. Bush also referred to the lessons of the US involvement in Vietnam 
for the first Gulf War in his diaries.62 Confronted with the new global political 
landscape after the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration looked to the 
aftermath of World War Two and early Cold War for blueprints to set up interna-
tional organizations.63 Scholars have also shown how Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright ’ s memory of Munich informed the Clinton administration ’ s public posi-
tion on the war in Kosovo in 1999.64 For his own part,
During his presidency, [George W.] Bush frequently invoked the Truman adminis-
tration ’ s strategic posture during the early Cold War years as precedents for the Bush 
60 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 8.
61 One fascinating use of Neustadt and May ’ s study is its application to cyber security threats. See David 
Sulek and Ned Moran, “What Analogies Can Tell Us About the Future of Cybersecurity,” Policy paper. 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/virtual 
battlefield/08_SULEK_What%20Cyber%20Analogies%20Can%20Tell%20Us.pdf. 
62 William Inboden, “Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxo-
nomy.” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014): 291–92.
63 Inboden, “Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties,” 308–9.
64 Paris, “Kosovo and the Metaphor War,” 435, 437.
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administration policies in the Global War on Terror. For example, in his […] West 
Point commencement address, Bush drew the Truman parallels at great length. These 
were not limited to public rhetoric. Bush also privately studied Truman ’ s presidency, 
and saw in Truman ’ s persona and challenges numerous parallels to his own. These 
included a populist diction style, low approval ratings, an unpopular localized hot war 
amidst a global ideological conflict, disputes with Congress and the Supreme Court 
over executive authority, efforts to forge new domestic and international institutions 
to address the prevailing security threat, and confidence in the eventual vindication 
of history.65
Inboden not only supports his analysis with evidence from contemporary 
newspaper accounts and scholarly treatments, but also cites Bush ’ s memoir. Yet 
much of this may still be interpreted as public relations, government rhetoric or 
retrospective justification by a leader of his own decisions in order to shape his 
own historical legacy – if it wasn’t for the fact that Inboden himself had “also 
worked on the National Security Council staff from 2005–2007, and responded to 
Bush ’ s interest in Truman by writing multiple memos drawing on the lessons of 
the Truman presidency.”66 However, without such internal evidence, such studies 
lack verifiable data about memory in policy making.
Thus, even as Neustadt and May ’ s study illuminates the internal dynamics 
of high-government decision making, their model is difficult to apply in recent 
historical or current scholarship. Hence, instead of studying its role in policy mak-
ing, it is more feasible to examine the uses of collective memory in Transatlantic 
relations. Since many relevant Cold War US government documents are still inac-
cessible,67 the remainder of this article attempts to “reverse engineer” traces of US 
memory policy from declassified government papers as well as public diplomacy 
65 Inboden, “Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties,” 309.
66 Inboden, “Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties,” 309.
67 The National Archives “has generally not yet accessioned records dated after the mid-1970s, although 
in some cases there are records dating to 1999.” Records of the U.S. Information Agency (RG 306). Cold 
War Era Agencies. National Archives, http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records 
/rg-306.html. The Department of State “Central file records dating 1980 and later remain in the custody 
of the Department of State. Researchers must file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request directly 
with the Department to request access to records in their custody.” Central Files 1973–1979: State Archiv-
ing System (SAS)(RG 59). Department of State Records. National Archives, http://www.archives.gov 
/research/foreign-policy/state-dept/rg-59-central-files/1973-1979.html. The Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs Historical Collection was donated to the University of Arkansas by the United States 
Information Agency in 1983. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection (CU) 
Records, ca. 1938–1984. University of Arkansas Liberaries Special Collections, http://libinfo.uark.edu 
/SpecialCollections/findingaids/cuaid/. 
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materials. Accordingly, its findings will be preliminary, pending the fuller declas-
sification of internal government documents.
The Cold War Apparatus for Memory Policy:  
The United States Information Agency
Building the material infrastructure and human bureaucracy of the Cold War 
took decades, and its structures predictably survived for years after the end of this 
ideological world system. Accordingly, for much of the 1990s, the United States 
government had in place an apparatus for the use of memory in its Transatlantic 
relations. 
Among the many tools the United States government used during the Cold 
War to win the hearts and minds of those living in the developing world and coun-
ter Communist propaganda was American history. Scholars like Richard Pells have 
discussed the ways in which American Studies, the academic study of US history, 
culture and society, was transplanted in Europe through the educational diplo-
macy of the US government ’ s Fulbright Program, professional organizations, and 
private foundations.68 Yet academia is only one player or mechanism in the larger 
dynamic of the politics of collective memory within and between countries. The 
US government used cultural memory in its programming which commemorated 
various anniversaries of the national past – as a way to support its foreign policy 
objectives. In the late Cold War and beyond, most such programming was car-
ried out by three government agencies: the United States Information Agency, the 
Department of Defense, and commemorative presidential commissions. 
Created in 1953 by presidential executive order, the United States Informa-
tion Agency (called “Service” at its end points overseas; henceforth USIA/S) was 
to centrally conduct the US government ’ s previously disparate foreign informa-
tion activities.69 In 1978 another presidential order merged USIA/S with the State 
Department ’ s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs70 into a new entity called 
the United States International Communications Agency. In 1982 the agency was 
68 See Richard Pells, “American Studies in Europe,” in Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, 
and Transformed American Culture Since World War II, by Richard Pells (New York: Basic Books, 
1997), 94–133; also Michael Denning, “‘The Special American Conditions’: Marxism and American 
Studies,” in Culture in the Age of Three Worlds, by Michael Denning (London, New York: Verso, 
2004), 169–92.
69 See Richard Arndt, “The Birth of USIA,” in The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in 
the Twentieth Century, by Richard T. Arndt (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 264–87.
70 History and Mission of ECA. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States Department 
of State, http://eca.state.gov/about-bureau/history-and-mission-eca.
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rechristened to its original name, which it used until is abolition in 1999, when 
its media functions, including the Voice of America, were assigned to the State 
Department and the International Broadcasting Bureau.71 In a regretful act of 
shortsightedness, the US government ’ s primary arm of cultural diplomacy, the 
USIA/S was dismantled just two years before the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, which prompted the government to put in place a new apparatus for public 
diplomacy.72 
After its 1978 reorganization, USIA/S was a government agency with formi-
dable activities. Every year, its Fulbright program gave out some 5000 grants for 
sending overseas or bringing to the United States individuals for teaching or aca-
demic study. Its equivalent for non-academic professions, the International Visi-
tors Program facilitated the trips to the US of some 2000 people every year. Like 
US public diplomacy in general, both of these programs targeted foreign elites 
and would-be elites (most often students or vocational apprentices) in order to 
mold their attitudes towards the United States both in their own professions and 
more generally, as a geopolitical player. In this, they were assisted by USIA ’ s Eng-
lish teaching and book programs, as well as its actual facilities overseas: embassy 
libraries, America houses and other cultural centers, with their own programming. 
USIA/S also facilitated the tours of art exhibitions and performing artists overseas, 
including in Eastern Europe and the USSR, as well as in the third world. 73 
The Reagan administration not only gave the agency its old name back, but 
it also updated it in its own image. In keeping with the resurgence of hard line 
anti-Communism in US foreign policy, the USIA/S was to shift back from being 
a facilitator of international cultural exchange and democratic dialog to being an 
instrument of US overseas propaganda, and a weapon for winning the Cold War.74 
Accordingly, with increases in funding, the agency launched Radio (and later TV) 
Martí, targeted at Cuba; it implemented Worldnet, a  satellite linkup for policy 
discussions between US and foreign government officials; and it modernized the 
technology of the Voice of America.75 The institution ’ s overseas libraries were con-
71 Records of the U.S. Information Agency (RG 306) description. Cold War Era Agencies. Foreign 
Affairs. National Archives of the United States, http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy 
/related-records/rg-306.html.
72 Also see Christopher Merrill et al., Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy. Report 
of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 
September 2005, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf.
73 Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2005), 521, 524.
74 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 527, 532.
75 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 527.
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verted into Information Resource Centers, equipped with electronic apparatuses, 
but were also guarded by heavier security and a requirement of appointments for 
visitors. Both the Fulbright and the International Visitors Program came under 
more control and ideological programming; and USIA/S inaugurated a new pro-
gram to bring high school students to the US for one year to win them over for 
democracy before their ideological positions hardened.76 Meanwhile, responding to 
ideological disagreements with a suspension of multilateral cultural exchange, the 
United States officially withdrew from the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, pulling a quarter of UNESCO ’ s operating budget.77 
In order to understand how USIA “projected” American collective memory 
around the world, it is important to know the sources of its materials. Passed by US 
Congress in 1948, the so-called Smith-Mundt Act forbade government materials 
designed for foreign consumption to be disseminated within the United States, in 
order to prevent the government from propagandizing its own population. The 
law, however, still allowed materials originally designed for domestic consumption 
to be used in overseas cultural diplomacy. This meant that USIA/S could both 
produce brand new materials and use the visuals, documents, films, exhibitions 
produced domestically and disseminate them overseas, however much adapted to 
their different audiences and circumstances. 
The Bicentennial of the United States Constitution  
in US Transatlantic Cultural Diplomacy
A USIA report from this period provides a window into how the agency worked 
in tandem with a presidential commission to use collective memory as part of its 
cultural and public diplomacy activities. The Commission on the Bicentennial of 
the U.S. Constitution was established in September of 1983 by the US government 
76 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 529. The US government ’ s cultural and educational programs for 
high-school age youth overseas were a response to the upheavals of the 1960s and especially the “glo-
bal” 1968, in which student activism challenged not only their own national hierarchies and norms, 
but also articulated criticism of US foreign policy. For more, see “Student Protest and International 
Relations,” in The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 
Sixities, by Martin Klimke (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 194–235. 
77 Arndt, The First Resort of Kings, 534, 531–32. Also see “Communication from the Secretary of Sta-
te of the United States of America Concerning the Withdrawal of the United States of America.” 
Item 5.1 of the agenda. Hundred-and-nineteenth Session. United Nations Educational, Scienti-
fic and Cultural Organization Executive Board. Paris, May 11, 1984, http://unesdoc.unesco.org 
/images/0005/000595/059531eo.pdf; “Text of Statement by U.S. on its Withdrawal from UNESCO,” The 
New York Times, December 20, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/20/world/text-of-statement 
-by-us-on-its-withdrawal-from-unesco.html.
53
in order to plan activities commemorating the September 17, 1787, signing of the 
United States Constitution, the formation of the three branches of government, 
and the subsequent addition of the Bill of Rights to the nation ’ s foundational legal 
document. Headed by former Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the 
Commission had some twenty members, and commanded considerable prestige. 
The most logical partner for the Commission ’ s overseas initiatives was the United 
States Information Agency, the government ’ s propaganda and cultural diplomacy 
arm. As USIA ’ s late 1987 “Four-Year Review Update” explained,
The foundations of the Bicentennial of the Constitution programming were laid in 
1984 and 1985. Beginning in 1986, on-going [USIA/S] programs such as the Inter-
national Visitor, Youth, Teacher, and Fulbright exchange programs and the Book and 
Library programs began to include a Constitutional component. In addition, overseas 
posts and USIA Washington elements have developed special seminars, conferences 
and publications designed to maximize the impact of the Bicentennial abroad and to 
increase knowledge and understanding of American culture and society in the context 
of our governmental system.78
While the Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution was man-
dated by Congress to coordinate commemorative activities, most such program-
ming outside of the country was implemented as well as designed by the United 
States Information Agency, the cultural diplomacy arm of the US government. 
Thus, USIA/S received a second-hand mandate from the Commission for over-
seas commemorative programming – which it did first by incorporating and fore-
grounding the US Constitution in its already existing programs, and subsequently 
by having its posts and offices design new activities with a more exclusive consti-
tutional focus. 
While the agency ’ s programs extended hemispherically to the Americas as 
well as to world regions such as Africa, the Middle East, the Pacific and south Asia, 
the geographical foci of its Transatlantic activities were the North European coun-
tries (the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland), the region of Central and 
Southern Europe (West Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain), with incursions made 
into the West (France), the Eastern Bloc (Poland, Romania), and the nonaligned 
78 Mark Blitz, “Four-Year Review Update” of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution pro-
gramming. Memorandum for the director of the United States Information Agency. October 20, 1987. 
In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.” 
Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Office of Federal and International Pro-
grams. National Archives at College Park, Maryland. 
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world (Serbia in Yugoslavia). Countries that received considerable attention in 
USIA/S  commemorative programming because of their special geopolitical 
importance to the United States were the old Transatlantic ally Great Britain, the 
Cold War ’ s “frontline” country of West Germany (the youth of which had become 
more critical of the US since the 1960s), Italy, which had a strong political left, 
and Spain, which had been transitioning from General Franco ’ s dictatorship to 
democracy since 1978. Attendees of the commemorative events came from these 
countries as well as others in and outside Europe.
The target audiences of USIA/S  commemorative programming were the 
respective host countries’ elites: academics, educators, lawyers, journalists, gov-
ernment officers and politicians, and university and high school students. (One 
prototypical example for this was a special course at Madrid University exclu-
sively devoted to the bicentennial of the US Constitution.) The highest-ranked 
guest in attendance was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was also 
awarded a prize of recognition for her public service.79 USIA ’ s bicentennial pro-
gramming reached hundreds of the national elite in each country directly – and 
thousands more through literature, as well as tens of thousands more through 
media coverage.80
Funding for the commemorative programming of the bicentennial of the 
US Constitution came from the Commission, USIA, private donors (e.g. Italian 
banks), professional bodies, and educational institutions like the University of 
Bologna. Activities also received in-kind assistance from foreign governments, 
which hosted receptions and events with a diplomatic profile in their own facili-
ties. (Events were otherwise mostly held either at US embassy and USIA/S libraries 
and centers, or at university centers.) The magnitude of the funds spent on com-
memorative programming is suggested by some examples. Its Paris post requested 
from USIA ’ s educational and cultural bureau a grant of 15,000 USD for a confer-
ence on the current status of US civil rights (voting, education and employment), 
which was to be co-sponsored by relevant departments of the University of Par-
is. USIA ’ s Dublin post received 10,000 USD from the Fulbright program ’ s 1987 
79 “Embassy Commemoration of the Constitution Bicentennial.” American Embassy London cable to 
USIA Washington, D.C., September 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemo-
rate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.” 
80 One Spanish TV program ’ s viewership was an estimated 750,000 people. Like those of any other 
government office, the reports of the United States information Agency were produced with a sub-
text that attempts to justify and argue for continued funding for the activities of the authors; thus, 
their perspective is self-celebratory and has a potential for overstating their reach and effectiveness. 
“Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
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budget to organize a commemorative academic colloquium with the Irish Associ-
ation for American Studies in Galway.81 
USIA needed this money not only for its events but also for the materials it 
produced and distributed in its programming. The agency ’ s repertoire included an 
impressive array of types of products and media, most of which was mass-produced 
or replicated for its overseas posts. The USIA created and shipped abroad a number 
of copies of its poster show, a book exhibit, a variety of old and new book transla-
tions, bibliographical guides, professional journal issues, video tapes for schools, 
its TV broadcasts made for VHS tapes and aired on satellite linkup, and it planned 
a BBC documentary series for the 1988 presidential elections.82 
In the Commission ’ s alliance with USIA, Justice Burger especially used his 
professional network to mobilize the legal and academic world for overseas com-
memorative programming. Commemorative speakers were mostly US academics 
and legal experts, high court justices and clerks, as well as their European coun-
terparts, especially university professors of American Studies from a variety of 
disciplines, especially Political Science. The fields and topics of the US Constitu-
tion ’ s bicentennial commemorative events reflected both Justice Burger ’ s interests 
and USIA ’ s foci in Transatlantic cultural diplomacy. Predominant in the program-
ming were academic and processional conferences in the fields of History, Politi-
cal Science, Constitutional Law, and related disciplines in the Social Sciences and 
Public Administration. The bicentennial ’ s major topics in focus were The Federalist 
Papers, federalism, regionalism, the religious conscience in the US Constitution, 
the Constitution and party politics, elections, the presidency, Supreme Court cases 
about contemporary issues, the Court ’ s schools of interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, the Constitution ’ s influence on European law and integration (e.g. “compar-
ative U.S.-Italian constitutional law”), and civil and human rights. 
The bicentennial celebrations’ structure was dominated by professional and 
academic events. These included academic-style conferences, professional devel-
opment seminars and symposia such as the 1987 Salzburg Seminar in American 
Studies, and “representational events,” i. e. receptions at diplomatic posts and 
foreign governments. It is unclear how open these events were to the public at 
large – especially since most were likely only by invitation, involved serious litera-
ture for distribution to attendees, and featured mostly academic and professional 
speakers and attendees. The academic practice of respondents giving feedback on 
the lectures sounds democratic on the surface; however, in many cases this likely 
81 “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
82 “Four-Year Review Update.”
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consisted of nothing beyond a colleague ’ s accolades and intellectual posturing, 
filling time that otherwise could have been spent with open general questions and 
answers, or undirected discussion. 
For over three decades, USIA/S had been the overseas propaganda and cul-
tural diplomacy arm of the United States, and its style and content of messaging 
reflected its goals: to counter anti-US propaganda, persuade foreign audiences to 
become allies and adopt US-style democracy and capitalism wholesale, and to 
“manage” the “image” of the United States abroad. A predictable rhetorical trope 
serving this purpose was the presentation of the past as the genealogy of the 
present and a guidepost for the future: “Celebrating our common heritage flagged 
the fact that we share common interests in the contemporary world.” According-
ly, USIA ’ s commemorative conferences in West Germany “reinforced the basic 
theme of shared values” between two countries which had waged two world wars 
against each other, and had recently emerged from a rather lopsided postwar 
relationship of “re-education” or “reorientation.” In London, on the other hand, 
the launching of a fund-raising campaign for the restoration of the Benjamin 
Franklin House was a way of “highlighting the common roots of Anglo-American 
heritage, and could serve as an important center for cooperative programming 
by the embassy.”83
Yet USIA/S posts tailored commemorative communication to their needs 
and special circumstances in each country. USIA programming in West Germa-
ny especially reached out to “left-of-center” elites, described as “knee-jerk critics 
of the United States.” The agency ’ s Munich post had been trying for years to 
“counter […] left-of-center stereotypes of American society, values and domes-
tic policies.” Now the post used the Constitution bicentennial ’ s commemora-
tive conference to engage the “Bavarian left” about a common US-West German 
 foreign/security policy – to emphasize their “common democratic traditions 
which lead to common foreign policy goals.” Likely recalling the West German 
students’ anti-Vietnam movement of the 1960s and 1970s,84 “U.S. Minister in 
Berlin John Kornblum […] made an eloquent speech warning that younger gen-
erations on both sides of the Atlantic no longer looked to the past to moor the 
Atlantic Alliance, but must seek common interests in the multi-polar world.” 
Yet the West German posts’ report of their programming remained fundamen-
tally defensive: “the twelve Americans who attended the conference served as 
83 “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
84 See Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the 
Global Sixities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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resource people to counter much of the stereotype[d] arguments that are the 
hallmark of German leftist debate.”85
Several USIA/S country posts remade the commemorative topics according 
to their host country ’ s interests, and possibly also engaged in some US domes-
tic politics in the process. The US Embassy in Dublin used Fulbright money to 
jointly hold a commemorative academic colloquium with the Irish Association for 
American Studies, titled “The Place of Minorities in American Society.” In their 
request for a serious grant for a gathering with the theme of “What is the State of 
Civil Rights in the U.S. Today,” the Paris post argued that “[a]s the conference will 
stress the legal remedies available for the redress of grievances in these areas, it 
has particular relevance to the celebrations commemorating the bicentennial of 
our Bill of Rights, the French Revolution, and, in particular, the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen.”86 The post ’ s proposed list of US participants was so 
heavy on civil rights organizations and activists that a researcher might wonder if 
the program was put together by a progressive embassy worker partly to spite the 
conservative Reagan administration by showcasing its less then sterling civil rights 
record in a country whose citizens had a tradition of criticizing the United States. 
According to scholarly consensus, US and Western collective memory is con-
tested ground in that it is often used by the commemorative actors to wage struggles 
over current issues by making meaning of the past.87 As a foundational text that 
continues to shape and be shaped by contemporary events, the history of the United 
States Constitution lends itself especially well to such commemorative dynamic. In 
this sense, the running subtext of the bicentennial of the US Constitution ’ s celebra-
tions consisted of US foreign policy (Reagan ’ s hard-line anti-Communism and its 
overt and covert operations), and domestic political developments (in addition to 
the Iran-Contra scandal, Reagan ’ s failed nomination of Robert Bork for the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court).88 Not surprisingly, USIA/S personnel, US and European 
85 “Tutzing Conference on Bicentennial of the Constitution.” American Embassy Bonn (and post in 
Munich) cable to USIA Washington, D.C., August 6, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities 
to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.” 
86 “Request for Grant for October 1988 Conference on Civil Rights.” American Embassy Paris cable to 
USIA Washington, D.C., December 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemo-
rate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
87 Finney, “The Ubiquitous Presence,” 448; Resende and Dudryte, eds., Memory and Trauma in Inter-
national Relations, 62, 63, 71–73; Langenbacher and Shain, eds., Power and the Past, 8; and Bell, 
Memory, Trauma and World Politics, 5, 15.
88 The time period of the Constitution ’ s bicentennial celebrations (1984–88) coincided with a variety 
of significant events in US domestic politics and foreign policy. News about the Reagan Adminis-
tration ’ s Iran-Contra operations broke in November 1986, and the Tower Commission began con-
ducting its investigation of the National Security Council in December, and published their findings 
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speakers, and foreign media and audiences used the Constitution ’ s bicentennial to 
discuss the recent issues and events in US society and foreign policy. 
Some commemorative actors addressed current issues quite explicitly.  Several 
open discussions related the US Constitution to recent political events (1984 
elections, Supreme Court cases), and treated the central law as a flexible and liv-
ing text, which enables a self-correcting mechanism in US government. The US 
consul general in Zurich, Switzerland, at the 1987 commemorative reception at 
his residence “referred to the two principle themes in Washington this summer, 
the Iran-Contra hearings and the nomination of a new Supreme Court justice in 
which the fundamental question of checks and balances between the executive and 
legislative also figured into the political discussions.”89 At USIA ’ s commemorative 
academic colloquium with the Irish Association for American Studies, held on 
Galway and titled “The Place of Minorities in American Society,” one US speaker 
discussed the importance of the Senate confirmation hearings and rejection of 
Robert Bork for the post of Supreme Court justice.90 At a week-long international 
university seminar on the Constitution ’ s bicentennial in Spain, Stanford Universi-
ty American Studies professor Jack Rakove argued that the Vietnam war resulted 
in shifts in the constitutional framework for US foreign policy, and he explained 
the intricate dynamic of policy making.91 Sometimes the most trenchant criti-
cism of the recent past and present came from US participants who could not be 
 controlled by USIA/S. At the 1987 Tutzing Conference on the Bicentennial of the 
US Constitution, “former Senator George McGovern […] argued that virtually 
all U.S. presidents since WWII ha[ve] violated the [C]onstitution through illicit 
military interventions. His speech launched a debate on the limits of U.S. executive 
in February 1987. Committees in the US House of Representatives and Senate held hearings on 
the topic between May and August 1987, and published a joint report in November of that year. 
President Reagan nominated Robert Bork for the United States Supreme Court in July 1987, which 
was followed by long and intense debate in the Senate, and confirmation hearings in the Judiciary 
Committee. After a firestorm of opposition, Bork ’ s nomination was rejected by the United States 
Senate in late October 1987.
89 “Media Reaction: Celebration for the U.S. Constitution in Zurich.” American Embassy Bern cable 
to USIA Washington, D.C., September, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Comme-
morate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
90 “Celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution.” American Embassy Dublin cable to USIA 
Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate 
the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
91 “Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution Amparts.” American Embassy Madrid cable to USIA Washin-
gton, D.C., September, 1986. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicen-
tennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
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power in foreign affairs.”92 At their best, such conferences provided a forum for an 
open and critical discussion of current issues as rooted in the past. 
Yet even such open debate on the relevance of the past for the present had 
to be conducted on the terms of the organizers and US participants. The USIA 
post from Milan reported that the conference in Trieste and Padova featured 
Italian experts who were intimately familiar with the US system of constitu-
tional law, and they also followed it to be able to apply some of its elements in 
their own legal system.93 One of the few conflictual exchanges mentioned in the 
record involved an attendee ’ s public criticism of the US government ’ s foreign 
policy in Nicaragua and Grenada. Dubbed a “far-leftist member of the Bologna 
city council” by the US post in Florence, Italy, the attendee had to be “ejected” 
from the conference. The speaker attempted to save the situation by ascribing the 
criticism to the open nature of US and Western democracy94 – a rather dubious 
response after the physical exclusion of this dissenting voice from this “open” 
commemorative event.
Questions and comments by attendees and the host countries’ national media 
often expressed concerns about local issues as much they reflected on the past and 
present of the United States, or critiqued its role in the world. An Irish expert who 
had authored a British study on job discrimination in Northern Ireland said that 
US anti-discrimination legislation was applied as a model in recent UK policies 
against sex-based discrimination in hiring. He claimed that recently the UK and 
some other European countries had been more progressive than the US in such 
anti-discrimination legislation – likely referring to the demise of the Equal Rights 
Amendment in the state-by-state ratification process in the United State earlier in 
the decade.95 Spanish TV asked a US speaker questions about the death penalty 
in the US, the advantages of the jury system, and how the law protects US citizens 
92 “Tutzing Conference on Bicentennial of the Constitution.” American Embassy Bonn (and post in 
Munich) cable to USIA Washington, D.C., August 6, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities 
to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
93 “Bicentenary of the Constitution: Program at U of Trieste and Padova.” American Embassy Rome 
cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to 
Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
94 “Bicentennial of the Constitution: Report on Bologna Conference on the Constitution and What 
It Means Today, May 27–29, 1987.” American Consul in Florence cable to USIA Washington, D.C., 
June, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of the 
U.S. Constitution.”
95 “Celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution.” American Embassy Dublin cable to USIA 
Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate 
the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
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from “political abuses.”96 These questions may have especially resonated with audi-
ences in a country that had transitioned out of General Franco ’ s dictatorial rule 
only a decade earlier. 
Other voices expressed an anxious desire to keep the US government involved 
in European affairs. In Spain, the bicentennial programming were organized by 
national professional and academic bodies, who requested a few American speak-
ers from the US embassy. After the conference on the US Constitution in Tri-
este and Padova, the USIA/S post from Milan reported that “the mayor of Trieste 
thanked USIS for staying on in the city and expressed hope that the U.S. consu-
late in Trieste, which was closed a year ago, would reopen.”97 According to the 
post ’ s report, Italian lawyers and academics likewise praised the series of com-
memorative academic conferences sponsored or organized by USIA/S.
The ultimate subtext of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution was 
one of the very bedrocks of Western democratic political systems: the rule of law. 
Thus, in their commemorative activities, participants struggled over the meaning 
of the history of American rule of law in the present, and its implications for the 
future of the United States, its Transatlantic relations, and their own European 
countries: they debated the overarching question of whether, how long and in what 
form can the rule of law endure in the United States, as well as in the countries who 
had developed or adopted political or legal systems similar to or different from, the 
United States Constitution.
The perennial question of how to measure the impact of cultural diploma-
cy is always most burning for those who have to justify continued or increased 
funding for it, and USIA ’ s  late Cold War reports grappled with this challenge. 
The agency used a variety of ways to measure the success of its commemorative 
programming: their yardsticks included the events’ reach; the quality of the aca-
demic and professional conferences, especially of their discussions; the level of the 
event ’ s profile; and the composition and ideology of its participants and attendees. 
USIA ’ s success can also be measured with its potential for influence among the 
elites (academics, opinion and policy makers, legal experts) and its trickle-down 
among students of university and secondary school age. While quantitative stock 
taking would involve the numbers of people who moved across the Atlantic on US 
96 “Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution Amparts.” American Embassy Madrid cable to USIA Washin-
gton, D.C., September, 1986. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicen-
tennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
97 “Bicentenary of the Constitution: Program at U of Trieste and Padova.” American Embassy Rome 
cable to USIA Washington, D.C., December, 1987. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to 
Commemorate the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.”
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cultural diplomacy program in any given period, qualitative measures would size 
up the advancement of these same people – such as the alumni of the Fulbright 
program – into national positions of power, and their public professional or polit-
ical position vis-à-vis United States foreign policy. This highlights the networks 
which educational and cultural exchange programs build. The commemorative 
events allowed one US speaker in Spain to reunite with an old friend who had just 
been declared first in line for the leadership of Spain ’ s major opposition conserv-
ative party. After their private council, the speaker briefed the embassy about the 
meeting and his knowledge of the politician.98
Another measurable example of the impact of USIA ’ s commemorative pro-
gramming was a 7-page article in the major independent Polish Tygodnik Powsze-
chny newspaper in 1986 – with no apparent government censorship. The arti-
cle ’ s author claimed that in their Constitution, “Americans first of all stated the 
conviction that there are certain indispensable human rights that no government, 
under any pretext, has any power to question. […] The state, with all its institu-
tions, cannot therefore exceed the boundaries of its carefully limited authority. 
[…] Every person has the unquestioned right to decide matters which affect him, 
either directly or through his representatives; a government which is not elected is 
always usurpation and tyranny.”99 “The bicentennial of the American constitution 
has meaning not only for citizens of the USA but equally so for all those all over 
the globe for whom the ideals of freedom, equality, democracy and respect for 
human rights are dear. […] As a result of the Revolution, that American message 
became understandable for everyone: liberty, human rights, equality of oppor-
tunity.” In the conclusion of the article, the author emphasized the uniqueness 
of the American circumstances, and left it open to interpretation whether their 
Constitution can be applied as a model abroad – even as he noted its influence 
on the Polish constitution of 1791.100 Whether in collusion with the US Embassy 
or as a spokesperson of the democratic opposition emerging with Solidarity, the 
author used the occasion of an anniversary in another nation ’ s collective memory 
to articulate grassroots demands for democratic freedoms and rights – and implic-
itly against the Polish Communist regime.
  98 “FY-87 Ampart Albert Blaustein.” American Embassy Madrid cable to USIA Washington, D.C., 
December, 1986. In “Report on Worldwide USIA Activities to Commemorate the Bicentennial of 
the U.S. Constitution.”
  99 “Bicentennial of American Constitution.” American Embassy Warsaw cable to USIA Washington, 





Even a cursory case study such as this indicates that the apparatus most readily 
available and skilled at using collective memory in late Cold War US Transatlan-
tic relations was the State Department ’ s United States Information Agency/Ser-
vice. USIA/S worked in partnership with the government-appointed Commission 
on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. Whether or not the US government 
or the Commission had a general and overarching policy for the use of collec-
tive memory in foreign policy, USIA/S undertook this task first by incorporating 
the Constitution ’ s bicentennial to its ongoing programming, and subsequently by 
designing, creating and implementing new cultural diplomacy activities with a spe-
cific constitutional focus. USIA Washington and its overseas country posts had 
significant freedom in tailoring such programming to the special circumstances 
of each host country, as well as to the needs of US diplomacy there. In its com-
memorative programming, USIA targeted the host countries’ political/government, 
academic and professional elites, as well as their university and high school stu-
dents. USIA ’ s bicentennial materials, conferences, seminars, and receptions empha-
sized the importance of the United States Constitution not only for the democratic 
political evolution of the American system, but also for its comparative influence 
on various European countries’ legal and political mechanisms. While the public 
diplomacy messages of these bicentennial celebrations often relied on the trope 
of their shared past and values as the reason and impetus for their current and 
future alliance, both US and host country actors used the US Constitution ’ s past to 
take measure and make meaning of the present struggles in their own countries as 
well as of the Transatlantic partnership. The ultimate subtext of the US Constitu-
tion ’ s bicentennial celebrations was how much American rule of law endured, and 
how much it could be replicated in the Transatlantic realm. 
This article surveyed the existing scholarly literature on the role of collective 
memory in international, and more specifically, Transatlantic relations. In order 
to develop a framework to study the uses of the national past in US Transatlantic 
diplomacy in the Cold War and beyond, I critiqued the methodologies of some 
scholars, and sketched out the dynamic, multi-player, but nevertheless hierarchi-
cally structured politics of national memory within the United States itself. Next 
I analyzed how historical reasoning was used in academic training for government 
service and foreign policy decision making in the late Cold War. In the final section 
of this article, I analyzed the United States Information Agency as the Cold War 
apparatus for a memory policy in Transatlantic relations. As my case study of the 
US Constitution ’ s bicentennial programming demonstrated, while such a memory 
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policy may not have been articulated in any single central US government docu-
ment, it can still be assembled from the blueprints for foreign policy training, and 
the public statements, diplomatic correspondence, and commemorative practices 
of the time. The United States Information Agency was capable of implementing 
such a Transatlantic memory policy during the Cold War and much of the 1990s. 
The question for researchers of the post-Communist era is to what extent USIA 
engaged in such memory diplomacy after the end of the Cold War – and who took 
on this function after the agency was dismantled in 1999.
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